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Base: Document more the mitigations in man7/Mitigations.md
Document: * Unmap After Init * RELRO * -fstack-clash-protection * -fstack-protector / -fstack-protector-strong
This commit is contained in:
Brian Gianforcaro
Andreas Kling
parent
8b78ed6308
commit
0d196d14d2
Notes:
sideshowbarker
2024-07-18 22:08:09 +09:00
Author: https://github.com/bgianfo Commit: https://github.com/SerenityOS/serenity/commit/0d196d14d23 Pull-request: https://github.com/SerenityOS/serenity/pull/5416
1 changed files with 120 additions and 8 deletions
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@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ to collect and describe the mitigations in one centralized place.
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of Intel CPUs which allows the kernel to instruct the CPU
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to disable execution of code residing in user space.
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It was enabled in the following commit:
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It was enabled in the following [commit](https://github.com/SerenityOS/serenity/commit/8602fa5b49aa4e2b039764a14698f0baa3ad0532):
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```
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commit 8602fa5b49aa4e2b039764a14698f0baa3ad0532
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Author: Andreas Kling <awesomekling@gmail.com>
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@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ Kernel: Enable x86 SMEP (Supervisor Mode Execution Protection)
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SMEP, it allows a kernel to set user-space memory mappings
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that will cause a trap when accessing user-space memory.
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It was enabled in the following commit:
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It was enabled in the following [commit](https://github.com/SerenityOS/serenity/commit/9eef39d68a99c5e29099ae4eb4a56934b35eecde):
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```
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commit 9eef39d68a99c5e29099ae4eb4a56934b35eecde
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@ -50,7 +50,8 @@ It enables a program to voluntarily restrict its access to the kernel's syscall
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surface area. The allows the program to reduce the potential attack surface
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available if the program in question was exploited.
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It was first added in the following commit, and the majority of programs were enlightened later:
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It was first added in the following [commit](https://github.com/SerenityOS/serenity/commit/41c504a33becea8aa9b437cd3c0dc312b2bf1fe9),
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and the majority of programs were enlightened later:
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```
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commit 41c504a33becea8aa9b437cd3c0dc312b2bf1fe9
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@ -66,7 +67,8 @@ Kernel: Add pledge() syscall :^)
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It enables a program to voluntarily restrict its access to the filesystem.
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This reduces the potential surface area available if the program in question was exploited.
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It was first added in the following commit, and the majority of programs were enlightened later:
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It was first added in the following [commit](https://github.com/SerenityOS/serenity/commit/0569123ad7cb9c54df724c2bb85933ea3cf97134),
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and the majority of programs were enlightened later:
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```
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commit 0569123ad7cb9c54df724c2bb85933ea3cf97134
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@ -75,6 +77,7 @@ Date: Mon Jan 20 22:12:04 2020 +0100
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Kernel: Add a basic implementation of unveil()
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```
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### syscall call-from verification
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[syscall call-from verification](https://marc.info/?l=openbsd-tech&m=157488907117170&w=2) is
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@ -86,7 +89,7 @@ on boot, which makes finding syscall stubs in libc difficult
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for attackers. On serenity it is mostly just an inconvenience,
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as there currently is no libc random-relinking.
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It was first enabled in the following commit:
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It was first enabled in the following [commit](https://github.com/SerenityOS/serenity/commit/823186031d9250217f9a51829d34a96b74113334):
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```
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commit 823186031d9250217f9a51829d34a96b74113334
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@ -104,7 +107,8 @@ It tracks data that is initialized once during kernel boot and never
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touched again, post kernel initialization the memory is marked
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read only to protect it from potentially being modified by exploits.
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It was first enabled in the following commit and other kernel data structures were enlightened later:
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It was first enabled in the following [commit](https://github.com/SerenityOS/serenity/commit/d8013c60bb52756788e747183572067d6e3f204a)
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and other kernel data structures were enlightened later:
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```
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commit d8013c60bb52756788e747183572067d6e3f204a
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@ -112,7 +116,6 @@ Author: Andreas Kling <kling@serenityos.org>
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Date: Sun Feb 14 17:35:07 2021 +0100
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Kernel: Add mechanism to make some memory read-only after init finishes
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```
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### KUBSAN (Kernel Undefined Behavior Sanitizer)
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@ -123,7 +126,7 @@ It can find various issues including, overflows, out of bounds array
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accesses, type corruption, and many more. Undefined behavior bugs can often
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be exploited, KUBSAN allows developers to catch them during testing instead.
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It was first enabled in the following commit:
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It was first enabled in the following [commit](https://github.com/SerenityOS/serenity/commit/d44be968938ecf95023351a358c43c4957638d87):
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```
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commit d44be968938ecf95023351a358c43c4957638d87
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Author: Andreas Kling <kling@serenityos.org>
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@ -132,6 +135,115 @@ Date: Fri Feb 5 19:44:26 2021 +0100
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Kernel: KUBSAN! (Kernel Undefined Behavior SANitizer) :^)
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```
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### Kernel Unmap after init
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Umap after init allows the kerenel to remove functions which contain potentially
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dangerous [ROP gadgets](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Return-oriented_programming)
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from kernel memory after they have been used and are no longer needed. Notably the
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`write_cr4(..)` function used to control processor features like the SMEP/SMAP bits
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in the CR4 register, and the `write_cr0(..)` function used to control processor features
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like write protection, etc.
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With this mitigation it is now more difficult to craft a kernel exploit to do something
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like disabling SMEP / SMAP.
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It was first enabled in the following [commit](https://github.com/SerenityOS/serenity/commit/6136faa4ebf6a878606f33bc03c5e62de9d5e662):
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```
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commit 6136faa4ebf6a878606f33bc03c5e62de9d5e662
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Author: Andreas Kling <kling@serenityos.org>
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Date: Fri Feb 19 18:21:54 2021 +0100
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Kernel: Add .unmap_after_init section for code we don't need after init
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```
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### Reloaction Read-Only (RELRO)
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[RELRO](https://hockeyinjune.medium.com/relro-relocation-read-only-c8d0933faef3) is a mitigation
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in the linker and loader that hardens the data sections of an ELF binary.
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When linked with the relro option the resulting binary will have new sections emitted which
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contain the relro data (`.data.rel.ro` and `.data.rel.ro.local`). The sections will be placed
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into a program segment of type `PT_GNU_RELRO` which contains the relro sections.
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The loader can then detect the `PT_GNU_RELRO` segment and then make the regions read only after
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relocations have been performed.
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This mitigates attacks which for example attempt to overwrite the [Global Offset Table (GOT)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Global_Offset_Table).
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It was first enabled for executables in the following [commit](https://github.com/SerenityOS/serenity/commit/fa4c249425a65076ca04a3cb0c173d49472796fb):
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```
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commit fa4c249425a65076ca04a3cb0c173d49472796fb
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Author: Andreas Kling <kling@serenityos.org>
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Date: Thu Feb 18 18:43:20 2021 +0100
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LibELF+Userland: Enable RELRO for all userland executables :^)
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```
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Shared libraries were enabled in a folow up [commit](https://github.com/SerenityOS/serenity/commit/713b3b36be4f659e58e253b6c830509898dbd2fa):
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```
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commit 713b3b36be4f659e58e253b6c830509898dbd2fa
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Author: Andreas Kling <kling@serenityos.org>
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Date: Thu Feb 18 22:49:58 2021 +0100
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DynamicLoader+Userland: Enable RELRO for shared libraries as well :^)
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```
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### -fstack-clash-protection
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The GCC compiler option [`-fstack-clash-protection`](https://gcc.gnu.org/onlinedocs/gcc/Instrumentation-Options.html)
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is a mitigation which helps prevent [stack clash](https://blog.qualys.com/vulnerabilities-research/2017/06/19/the-stack-clash)
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style attacks by generating code which allocates and immediately accesses one page of stack at a time.
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This prevents attackers from creating situations in which stack allocations jump over a guard page into whatever lies after.
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It was first enabled in the following [commit](https://github.com/SerenityOS/serenity/commit/7142562310e631156d1f64aff22f068ae2c48a5e):
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```
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commit 7142562310e631156d1f64aff22f068ae2c48a5e
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Author: Andreas Kling <kling@serenityos.org>
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Date: Fri Feb 19 09:11:02 2021 +0100
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Everywhere: Build with -fstack-clash-protection
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```
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### -fstack-protector / -fstack-protector-strong
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The GCC compiler provides a few variants of the `-fstack-protector` option mitigation.
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This family of flags enables [buffer overflow protection](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Buffer_overflow_protection)
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to mitigate [stack-smashing attacks](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stack_buffer_overflow).
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The compiler implements the mitigation by storing a canary value randomized on program startup into the preamble of all
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functions. Code is then generated to check that stack canary on function return and crash if the value has been changed,
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and hence a stack corruption has been detected.
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`-fstack-protector` was first enabled in the following [commit](https://github.com/SerenityOS/serenity/commit/67142562310e631156d1f64aff22f068ae2c48a5e):
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```
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commit 842716a0b5eceb8db31416cd643720c1037032b2
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Author: Andreas Kling <awesomekling@gmail.com>
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Date: Fri Dec 20 20:51:50 2019 +0100
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Kernel+LibC: Build with basic -fstack-protector support
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```
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It was later re-enabled and refined to `-fstack-protector-strong` in the following commits:
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```
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commit fd08c93ef57f71360d74b035214c71d7f7bfc5b8
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Author: Brian Gianforcaro <b.gianfo@gmail.com>
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Date: Sat Jan 2 04:27:35 2021 -0800
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LibC: Randomize the stack check cookie value on initialization
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commit 79328b2aba6192caf28f560881e56ff23fcb7294
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Author: Brian Gianforcaro <b.gianfo@gmail.com>
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Date: Sat Jan 2 03:02:42 2021 -0800
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Kernel: Enable -fstack-protector-strong (again)
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commit 06da50afc71a5ab2bc63de54c66930a2dbe379cd
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Author: Brian Gianforcaro <b.gianfo@gmail.com>
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Date: Fri Jan 1 15:27:42 2021 -0800
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Build + LibC: Enable -fstack-protector-strong in user space
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```
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## See also
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* [`unveil`(2)](../man2/unveil.md)
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