This commit removes the usage of HashMap in Mutex, thereby making Mutex
be allocation-free.
In order to achieve this several simplifications were made to Mutex,
removing unused code-paths and extra VERIFYs:
* We no longer support 'upgrading' a shared lock holder to an
exclusive holder when it is the only shared holder and it did not
unlock the lock before relocking it as exclusive. NOTE: Unlike the
rest of these changes, this scenario is not VERIFY-able in an
allocation-free way, as a result the new LOCK_SHARED_UPGRADE_DEBUG
debug flag was added, this flag lets Mutex allocate in order to
detect such cases when debugging a deadlock.
* We no longer support checking if a Mutex is locked by the current
thread when the Mutex was not locked exclusively, the shared version
of this check was not used anywhere.
* We no longer support force unlocking/relocking a Mutex if the Mutex
was not locked exclusively, the shared version of these functions
was not used anywhere.
Devices such as NVMe can have blocks bigger that 512. Use the
m_block_size variable in read/write_block function instead of the
hardcoded 512 block size.
This is being used by GUID partitions so the first three dash-delimited
fields of the GUID are stored in little endian order but the last two
fields are stored in big endian order, hence it's a representation which
is mixed.
Ideally the x86 fault handler would only do x86 specific things and
delegate the rest of the work to MemoryManager. This patch moves some of
the address checks to a more generic place.
This avoids taking and releasing the MM lock just to reject an address
that we can tell from just looking at it that it won't ever be in the
kernel regions tree.
When the values we're setting are not actually u32s and the size of the
area we're setting is PAGE_SIZE-aligned and a multiple of PAGE_SIZE in
size, there's no point in using fast_u32_fill, as that forces us to use
STOSDs instead of STOSQs.
We were marking the execing thread as Runnable near the end of
Process::do_exec().
This was necessary for exec in processes that had never been scheduled
yet, which is a specific edge case that only applies to the very first
userspace process (normally SystemServer). At this point, such threads
are in the Invalid state.
In the common case (normal userspace-initiated exec), making the current
thread Runnable meant that we switched away from its current state:
Running. As the thread is indeed running, that's a bogus change!
This created a short time window in which the thread state was bogus,
and any attempt to block the thread would panic the kernel (due to a
bogus thread state in Thread::block() leading to VERIFY_NOT_REACHED().)
Fix this by not touching the thread state in Process::do_exec()
and instead make the first userspace thread Runnable directly after
calling Process::exec() on it in try_create_userspace_process().
It's unfortunate that exec() can be called both on the current thread,
and on a new thread that has never been scheduled. It would be good to
not have the latter edge case, but fixing that will require larger
architectural changes outside the scope of this fix.
This makes sure DeviceManagement::try_create_device will call the
static factory function (if available) instead of directly calling the
constructor, which will allow us to move OOM-fallible calls out of
Device constructors.
If we panic the kernel for a storage-related reason, we might as well be
helpful and print out a list of detected storage devices and their
partitions to help with debugging.
Reasons for such a panic include:
- No boot device with the given name found
- No boot device with the given UUID found
- Failing to open the root filesystem after determining a boot device
Before attempting to remove the device while handling an AHCI port
interrupt, check if m_connected_device is even non-null.
This happened during my bare metal run and caused a kernel panic.
A number of crashes in this `VERIFY_NOT_REACHED` case have been
reported on discord. Lets add some tracing to gather more information
and help diagnose what is the cause of these crashes.
There are many assumptions in the stack that argc is not zero, and
argv[0] points to a valid string. The recent pwnkit exploit on Linux
was able to exploit this assumption in the `pkexec` utility
(a SUID-root binary) to escalate from any user to root.
By convention `execve(..)` should always be called with at least one
valid argument, so lets enforce that semantic to harden the system
against vulnerabilities like pwnkit.
Reference: https://www.qualys.com/2022/01/25/cve-2021-4034/pwnkit.txt
This allows us to enable Write-Combine on e.g. framebuffers,
significantly improving performance on bare metal.
To keep things simple we right now only use one of up to three bits
(bit 7 in the PTE), which maps to the PA4 entry in the PAT MSR, which
we set to the Write-Combine mode on each CPU at boot time.
InodeWatcher::register_inode was already partially fallible, but the
insertion of the inodes and watch descriptions into their respective
hash maps was not. Note that we cannot simply TRY the insertion into
both, as that could result in an inconsistent state, instead we must
remove the inode from the inode hash map if the insertion into the
watch description hash map failed.
There's no need to perform it this early, and until the MemoryManager
is initialized we have very limited kmalloc capacity, so let's try and
keep anything that's not required to be there out of there.