Some programs explicitly ask for a different initial stack size than
what the OS provides. This is implemented in ELF by having a
PT_GNU_STACK header which has its p_memsz set to the amount that the
program requires. This commit implements this policy by reading the
p_memsz of the header and setting the main thread stack size to that.
ELF::Image::validate_program_headers ensures that the size attribute is
a reasonable value.
This commit makes it possible for a process to downgrade a file lock it
holds from a write (exclusive) lock to a read (shared) lock. For this,
the process must point to the exact range of the flock, and must be the
owner of the lock.
Joining dead threads is allowed for two main reasons:
- Thread join behavior should not be racy when a thread is joined and
exiting at roughly the same time. This is common behavior when threads
are given a signal to end (meaning they are going to exit ASAP) and
then joined.
- POSIX requires that exited threads are joinable (at least, there is no
language in the specification forbidding it).
The behavior is still well-defined; e.g. it doesn't allow a dead
detached thread to be joined or a thread to be joined more than once.
The fact that we used a Vector meant that even if creating a Mount
object succeeded, we were still at a risk that appending to the actual
mounts Vector could fail due to OOM condition. To guard against this,
the mount table is now an IntrusiveList, which always means that when
allocation of a Mount object succeeded, then inserting that object to
the list will succeed, which allows us to fail early in case of OOM
condition.
From now on, we don't allow jailed processes to open all device nodes in
/dev, but only allow jailed processes to open /dev/full, /dev/zero,
/dev/null, and various TTY and PTY devices (and not including virtual
consoles) so we basically restrict applications to what they can do when
they are in jail.
The motivation for this type of restriction is to ensure that even if a
remote code execution occurred, the damage that can be done is very
small.
We also don't restrict reading and writing on device nodes that were
already opened, because that limit seems not useful, especially in the
case where we do want to provide an OpenFileDescription to such device
but nothing further than that.
`SysFSComponentRegistry`, `ProcFSComponentRegistry` and
`attach_null_device` "just work" already; let's include them to match
x86_64 as closely as possible.
We have a new, improved string type coming up in AK (OOM aware, no null
state), and while it's going to use UTF-8, the name UTF8String is a
mouthful - so let's free up the String name by renaming the existing
class.
Making the old one have an annoying name will hopefully also help with
quick adoption :^)
This patch adds a way to ask the allocator to skip its internal
scrubbing memset operation. Before this change, kcalloc() would scrub
twice: once internally in kmalloc() and then again in kcalloc().
The same mechanism already existed in LibC malloc, and this patch
brings it over to the kernel heap allocator as well.
This solves one FIXME in kcalloc(). :^)
This solves one of the security issues being mentioned in issue #15996.
We simply don't allow creating hardlinks on paths that were not unveiled
as writable to prevent possible bypass on a certain path that was
unveiled as non-writable.
Instead, allow userspace to decide on the coredump directory path. By
default, SystemServer sets it to the /tmp/coredump directory, but users
can now change this by writing a new path to the sysfs node at
/sys/kernel/variables/coredump_directory, and also to read this node to
check where coredumps are currently generated at.
By default, disallow reading of values in that directory. Later on, we
will enable sparingly read access to specific files.
The idea that led to this mechanism was suggested by Jean-Baptiste
Boric (also known as boricj in GitHub), to prevent access to sensitive
information in the SysFS if someone adds a new file in the /sys/kernel
directory.
There's simply no benefit in allowing sandboxed programs to change the
power state of the machine, so disallow writes to the mentioned node to
prevent malicious programs to request that.
Previously we tried to determine if `fd` refers to a non-regular file by
doing a stat() operation on the file.
This didn't work out very well since many File subclasses don't
actually implement stat() but instead fall back to failing with EBADF.
This patch fixes the issue by checking for regular files with
File::is_regular_file() instead.
We used size_t, which is a type that is guarenteed to be large
enough to hold an array index, but uintptr_t is designed to be used
to hold pointer values, which is the case of stack guards.
To accomplish this, we add another VeilState which is called
LockedInherited. The idea is to apply exec unveil data, similar to
execpromises of the pledge syscall, on the current exec'ed program
during the execve sequence. When applying the forced unveil data, the
veil state is set to be locked but the special state of LockedInherited
ensures that if the new program tries to unveil paths, the request will
silently be ignored, so the program will continue running without
receiving an error, but is still can only use the paths that were
unveiled before the exec syscall. This in turn, allows us to use the
unveil syscall with a special utility to sandbox other userland programs
in terms of what is visible to them on the filesystem, and is usable on
both programs that use or don't use the unveil syscall in their code.
Because the ".." entry in a directory is a separate inode, if a
directory is renamed to a new location, then we should update this entry
the point to the new parent directory as well.
Co-authored-by: Liav A <liavalb@gmail.com>
Each GenericInterruptHandler now tracks the number of calls that each
CPU has serviced.
This takes care of a FIXME in the /sys/kernel/interrupts generator.
Also, the lsirq command line tool now displays per-CPU call counts.
This patch fixes some include problems on aarch64. aarch64 is still
currently broken but this will get us back to the underlying problem
of FloatExtractor.
We now disallow jail creation from a process within a jail because there
is simply no valid use case to allow it, and we will probably not enable
this behavior (which is considered a bug) again.
Although there was no "real" security issue with this bug, as a process
would still be denied to join that jail, there's an information reveal
about the amount of jails that are or were present in the system.
